Let us attack this question by asking, first, what is an explanation of the meaning of a word; what does the explanation
of a word look like?
The way this question helps us is analogous to the way the question "how do we measure a length?" helps
us to understand the problem "what is length?"
The questions "What is length?", "What is meaning?", "What is the number one?" etc.,
produce in us a mental cramp. We feel that we can't point to anything in reply to them and yet ought to point to
something. (We are up against one of the great sources of philosophical bewilderment : a substantive makes us look
for a thing that corresponds to it.)
Asking first "What's an explanation of meaning?" has two advantages. You in a sense bring the question
"what is meaning?" down to earth. For, surely, to understand the meaning of "meaning" you ought
also to understand the meaning of "explanation of meaning". Roughly: "let's ask what the explanation
of meaning is, for whatever that explains will be the meaning." Studying the grammar of the expression "explanation
of meaning" will teach you something about the grammar of the word "meaning" and will cure you of
the temptation to look about you for some object which you might call "the meaning".
What one generally calls "explanations of the meaning of a word" can, very roughly, be divided into verbal
and ostensive definitions. It will be seen later in what sense this division is only rough and provisional (and
that it is, is an important point). The verbal definition, as it takes us from one verbal expression to another,
in a sense gets us no further. In the ostensive definition however we seem to make a much more real step towards
learning the meaning.
One difficulty which strikes us is that for many words in our language there do not seem to be ostensive definitions;
e.g. for such words as "one", "number", "not", etc.
Question: Need the ostensive definition itself be understood?--Can't the ostensive definition be misunderstood?
If the definition explains the meaning of a word, surely it can't be essential that you should have heard the
word before. It is the ostensive definition's business to give it a meaning. Let us then explain the word "tove"
by pointing to a pencil and saying -this is tove". (Instead of cc this is tove" I could here have said
"this is called 'tove, ". 1 point this out to remove, once and for all, the idea that the words of the
ostensive definition predicate something of the defined; the confusion between the sentence "this is red",
attributing the colour red to something, and the ostensive definition "this is called 'red' ".) Now the
ostensive definition "this is tove" can be interpreted in all sorts of ways. I will give a few such interpretations
and use English words with well established usage. The definition then can be interpreted to mean:
"This is a pencil",
"This is round",
"This is wood",
"This is one",
"This is hard", etc. etc.
One might object to this argument that all these interpretations presuppose another word-language. And this
objection is significant if by "interpretation" we only mean "translation into a word-language".--
me give some hints which might make this clearer. Let us ask ourselves what is our criterion when we say that someone
has interpreted the ostensive definition in a particular way. Suppose I give to an Englishman the ostensive definition
"this is what the Germans call 'Buch' ". Then, in the great majority of cases at any rate, the English
word "book" will come into the Englishman's mind. We may say he has interpreted "Buch" to mean
"book". The case will be different if e.g. we point to a thing which he has never seen before and say:
"This is a banjo". Possibly the word "guitar" will then come into his mind, possibly no word
at all but the image of a similar instrument, possibly nothing at all. Supposing then I give him the order "now
pick a banjo from amongst these things." If he picks what we call a "banjo" we might say "he
has given the word 'banjo' the correct interpretation"; if he picks some other instrument-- "he has interpreted
'banjo' to mean 'string instrument' ".
We say "he has given the word 'banjo' this or that interpretation", and are inclined to assume a definite
act of interpretation besides the act of choosing.
Our problem is analogous to the following:
If I give someone the order "fetch me a red flower from that meadow", how is he to know what sort
of flower to bring, as I have only given him a word?
Now the answer one might suggest first is that he went to look for a red flower carrying a red image in his mind,
and comparing it with the flowers to see which of them had the colour of the image. Now there is such a way of
searching, and it is not at all essential that the image we use should be a mental one. In fact the process may
be this: I carry a chart co-ordinating names and coloured squares. When I hear the order "fetch me etc."
I draw my finger across the chart from the word "red" to a certain
square, and I go and look for a flower which has the same colour as the square. But this is not the only way of
searching and it isn't the usual way. We go, look about us, walk up to a flower and pick it, without comparing
it to anything. To see that the process of obeying the order can be of this kind, consider the order "imagine
a red patch". You are not tempted in this case to think that before obeying you must have imagined a red patch
to serve you as a pattern for the red patch which you were
ordered to imagine.
Review
"Wittgenstein's later work, so long the privilege and possession of a few, is at last before the public
at large. The so-called Blue and Brown Books, originally dictated to his students in Cambridge in the thirties,
and circulated, not without precaution and secrecy, now follow the Investigations and the Remarks on Mathematics,
and with this the openingup process is complete. The event is welcome: it is certain that we need more free discussion,
rather than obscure reference to Wittgenstein's doctrines ....
the Blue Book already announces all the main themes of the later Wittgenstein--so rich yet so intimately interlocked.
Use and meaning and the fallacious 'name' theory; understanding and the mastery of a technique; rules, language-games
and 'forms of life'; these doctrines, and the denial of 'private languages,' fit together like the parts of a puzzle.
This book, for the sake of its compactness, and something of a special zest that has been admired, may make it
a good introduction to the later Wittgenstein .... it is only here [The Brown Book] that language-games and the
problems of rules come into full prominence. And the importance of the latter cannot be over-emphasized; later
philosophers have used the notion but rarely explored it as Wittgenstein did."
--David Pole, Philosophy
"There could be no better introduction to Wittgenstein's thought than the Blue Book, whose simplicity and
forthrightness must make an instant appeal. The progressive complications of the Brown Book make a natural bridge
to the still more subtle, but often confusing, exposition of the Investigations. Every serious student of philosophy
will want to own this volume."
--Max Black
"These studies have exercised considerable influence on the development of contemporary English philosophy."
--The Heythrop Journal (Oxford)
Harper Collins Publishing Web Site, November, 2000
Summary
The co-called Blue and Brown Books, originally dictated to his students in Cambridge in the thirties, and circulated,
not without precaution and secrecy, now follow the Investigations and the Remarks on Mathematics, and with this
the opening up process is complete.
