Ronald E. Powaski is the author of March to Armegeddon: The United States and the Nuclear Arms Race, 1939 to
the Present. He is Adjunct Professor of Special Studies at Notre Dame College of Ohio.
Summary
For half of the twentieth century, the Cold War gripped the world. International relations everywhere--and domestic
policy in scores of nations--pivoted around this central point, the American-Soviet rivalry. Even today, much of
the world's diplomacy grapples with chaos created by the Cold War's sudden disappearance. Here indeed is a subject
that defies easy understanding. Now comes a definitive account, a startlingly fresh, clear eyed, comprehensive
history of our century's longest struggle.
In The Cold War, Ronald E. Powaski offers a new perspective on the great rivalry, even as he provides a coherent,
concise narrative. He wastes no time in challenging the reader to think of the Cold War in new ways, arguing that
the roots of the conflict are centuries old, going back to Czarist Russia and to the very infancy of the American
nation. He shows that both Russia and America were expansionist nations with messianic complexes, and the people
of both nations believed they possessed a unique mission in history. Except for a brief interval in 1917, Americans
perceived the Russian government (whether Czarist or Bolshevik) as despotic; Russians saw the United States as
conspiring to prevent it from reaching its place in the sun. U.S. military intervention in Russia's civil war,
with the aim of overthrowing Lenin's upstart regime, entrenched Moscow's fears. Soviet American relations, difficult
before World War II--when both nations were relatively weak militarily and isolated from world affairs--escalated
dramatically after both nations emerged as the world's major military powers. Powaski paints a portrait of the
spiraling tensions with stark clarity, as each new development added to the rivalry: the Marshall Plan, the communist
coup in Czechoslovakia, the Berlin blockade, the formation of NATO, the first Soviet nuclear test. In this atmosphere,
Truman found it easy to believe that the Communist victory in China and the Korean War were products of Soviet
expansionism. He and his successors extended their own web of mutual defense treaties, covert actions, and military
interventions across the globe--from the Caribbean to the Middle East and, finally to Southeast Asia, where containment
famously foundered in the bog of Vietnam.
Powaski skillfully highlights the domestic politics, diplomatic maneuvers, and even psychological factors as he
untangles the knot that bound the two superpowers together in conflict. From the nuclear arms race, to the impact
of U.S. recognition of China on detente, to Brezhnev's inflexible persistence in competing with America everywhere,
he casts new light on familiar topics. Always judicious in his assessments, Powaski gives due credit to Reagan
and especially Bush in facilitating the Soviet collapse, but also notes that internal economic failure, not outside
pressure, proved decisive in the Communist failure. Perhaps most important, he offers a clear eyed assessment of
the lasting distortions the struggle wrought upon American institutions, raising questions about whether anyone
really won the Cold War. With clarity, fairness, and insight, he offers the definitive account of our century's
longest international rivalry.
A challenging account of our century's longest international rivalry
Argues that the roots of the Cold War go back over a century, to when both Russia and the U.S. were expansionist
nations with messianic complexes
Ranges from the Russian Revolution, to the Marshall Plan and the Berlin Blockade, to the era of Gorbachev,
Reagan, and Bush
Highlights the lasting distortions the struggle wrought upon American institutions
Table of Contents
Introduction: The U.S. and Czarist Russia
1. The U.S. and the Bolshevik Revolution, 1917-1933
2. F.D.R. and the Grand Alliance, 1933-1945
3. Truman and Containment, 1945-1953
4. Eisenhower and the Globalization of the Cold War, 1953-1961
5. Kennedy and Johnson: Confrontation and Cooperation, 1961-1969
6. Nixon, Ford, and Detente, 1969-1977
7. Carter and the Decline of Detente, 1977-1981
8. The Reagan Cold War, 1981-1989
9. George Bush adn the End of the Cold War, 1989-1991