The United States and the Soviet Union missed numerous diplomatic opportunities to resolve differences and control
the arms race because neither state trusted the other, according to Deborah Welch Larson. She shows that the goals
of Soviet and U.S. leaders were frequently complementary, and an agreement should have been attainable. Lost opportunities
contributed to bankruptcy for the Soviet Union, serious damage to the economy of the United States, decreased public
support for internationalist policies, and a proliferation of nuclear weapons. Synthesizing different understandings
of trust and mistrust from the theoretical traditions of economics, psychology, and game theory, Larson analyzes
five cases that might have been turning points in U.S.-Soviet relations: the two-year period following Stalin's
death in 1953; Khrushchev's peace offensive from the launching of Sputnik until the U-2 incident; the Kennedy administration;
the Nixon-Brezhnev detente; and the Gorbachev period. Larson concludes that leaders in the United States often
refused to accept Soviet offers to negotiate because they feared a trap.
Table of Contents
Preface
1 Distrust and Missed Opportunities in Foreign Policy
2 German Reunification and Disarmament
3 Disengagement, German Nuclear Weapons, and the Test Ban
4 JFK, Khrushchev, and the German Question
5 Success and Failure in SALT
6 The Allure of Defense
7 Missed Opportunities, Conflict Spirals, and History
