Anderson, David L. (Ed.) : University of Indianapolis

David L. Anderson is professor of history and political science at the University of Indianapolis. He is the author of Facing My Lai: Moving Beyond the Massacre, Imperialism and Idealism: American Diplomats in China, 1861-1898 and Trapped by Success: The Eisenhower Administration and Vietnam, 1953-1961, co-winner of the Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations 1992 Robert H. Ferrell Book Prize.

"The most useful book yet on the twin subjects of Vietnam and the presidents who shaped policy. These essays combine originality and analytic cogency in chronicling the expansion of presidential power and the war in Vietnam."

--Larry Berman, author of Lyndon Johnson's War: The Road to Stalemate in Vietnam

"A fine collection of essays by leading scholars of the Vietnam War. Focusing on the presidents who made and executed United States policy, the authors frequently provide fresh insights into the conflict and its impact on the presidency. This book should enliven and enrich what is fast becoming America's longest debate."

--Andrew J. Rotter, author of The Path to Vietnam: Origins of the Commitment to Southeast Asia

University Press of Kansas Web Site, September, 2000

Harry Truman's administration began searching for an American response to the clash in Indochina between Frech colonialism and Vietminh communism in 1945. Thirty years and five administrations later, Gerald Ford and his aides tried unsuccessfully to solicit additional aid for South Vietnam from a reluctant Congress. For Truman, Ford, and every American leader in between, the dilemma in Vietnam hung ominously over the presidency.

In Shadow on the White House, seven prominent historians examine how the leadership of six presidents and an issue that grew into a difficult and often unpopular war shaped each other. Focusing on the personalities, politics, priorities, and actions of the presidents as they confronted Vietnam, the authors consider the expansion of presidential power in foreign-policy formulation since World War II. In ther analyses, they chronicle the history of executive leadership as it related to Vietnam, assess presidential prerogatives and motives on war and peace issues, and clarify the interconnection between the modern presidency and tha nation's frustrating, tragic, and humiliating failure in Southeast Asia.

Although other histories have been written about the Vietnam experience, this book is the first systematic and comparative survey on presidential leadership as it relates to the war issue. It is organized by presidential administrations, giving a detailed examination of each president's decisions and policies. Based on the most recently opened archival sources, the essays provide a framework on which to hang the kaleidoscopic events of the war.