�This is a dialogue about the notion of a person, of an entity that thinks and feels and acts, that counts and
is accountable. Equivalently, it�s about the intentional idiom�the well-knit fabric of terms that we use to characterize
persons. Human beings are usually persons (a brain-dead human might be considered a human but not a person). However,
there may be persons, in various senses, that are not human beings. Much recent discussion has focused on hypothetical
computer-robots and on actual nonhuman great apes. The discussion here is naturalistic, which is to say that count
and accountability are, at least initially, presumed to be naturally well-knit with the possession of a cognitive
and affective life.�
--Justin Leiber, from the Introduction
�A delightful book, beautifully written and psychologically acute.�
--Peter T. Manicas, Queens College, CUNY
�Written in a lively and entertaining style, this little book, which deals with topics such as �personhood,� animal
rights, and artificial intelligence . . . makes some rather difficult philosophical points clear in an unpedantic
fashion.�
--M. E. Winston, Trenton State College
Hackett Publishing Company Web Site, August, 2000
Summary
�This is a dialogue about the notion of a person, of an entity that thinks and feels and acts, that counts and
is accountable. Equivalently, it�s about the intentional idiom � the well-knit fabric of terms that we use to characterize
persons. Human beings are usually persons (a brain-dead human might be considered a human but not a person). However,
there may be persons, in various senses, that are not human beings. Much recent discussion has focused on hypothetical
computer-robots and on actual nonhuman great apes. The discussion here is naturalistic, which is to say that count
and accountability are, at least initially, presumed to be naturally well-knit with the possession of a cognitive
and affective life.�
